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	 	 AbstrACt
Land property issues remain firmly on the agenda 
in  Nicaragua.  Revolutionary  land  reform,  followed  by  addi-
tional land redistribution and overnight liberalisation of land 
markets, are assumed to have caused severe insecurity of land 
tenure. Dominant received wisdom is that only significant state 
intervention  through  full-scale  legal  titling  cum  registration 
can put an end to the ongoing struggles that cause insecurity 
as well as injustices against poor agrarian reform beneficiaries. 
This view, inspired by economic and legal engineering perspec-
tives on land rights, has however successfully been challenged 
in other development contexts, particularly Africa, where a le-
gal pluralist view turned out to be more adequate to describe 
the complex social processes that define land rights. This view 
argues for a need to understand the detailed land right prac-
tices where legitimacy (and thus security) of land access and 
tenure is socially constructed by calling upon state as well as 
non-state sources of land rights. Policy conclusions do not call 
upon state intervention to remedy allegedly chaotic and unjust 
informal land practices, but rather calls for an institutional re-
organisation that contributes to a greater synergy between dif-
ferent sources of rights, thereby reducing insecurities and injus-
tices due to prevailing incompatibilities. Inspired by the legal 
pluralism view, our paper provides an attempt at interpretation 
of the real world land rights practices in an agricultural frontier 
region in Nicaragua. • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08
	 	 resumen
El tema de la propiedad de la tierra se mantiene 
firme en la agenda en Nicaragua. La reforma agraria Sandini-
sta, una redistribución adicional de tierra con el proceso de paz 
y una liberalización brusca y radical del mercado de tierra pare-
cen haber contribuido a una inseguridad marcada del acceso 
y la propiedad de la tierra. La visión dominante mantiene que 
solo una intervención estatal significativa a través de una titu-
lación legal y un registro comprehensivo sea capaz de meter un 
punto final a las luchas permanentes que causan inseguridad 
al igual que injusticias en contra de los beneficiarios pobres de 
la reforma agraria. Sin embargo, esta visión, inspirada desde la 
teoría económica o desde perspectivas de ingeniería legal, ha 
sido contestada exitosamente en otros contextos de desarrollo, 
en particular la África, donde una perspectiva de pluralismo 
legal comprobaba ser mucho más adecuada para describir y 
entender los procesos sociales complejos que definen los dere-
chos de propiedad. Esta visión argumenta por una necesidad de 
entender finamente las prácticas alrededor de los derechos a 
la tierra en las cuales la legitimidad (y entonces la seguridad) 
del derecho a la tierra se construye socialmente haciendo refer-
encia a fuentes de derecho tanto estatales como no-estatales. 
Las conclusiones en términos de políticas apuntan a una reor-
ganización institucional que trata de generar más sinergia en-
tre estas diferentes fuentes de derechos dentro de las arenas 
políticas de la tierra en vez de tratar de remediar un supuesto 
caos informal desde una legalidad estatal impuesta. Inspirado 
por una perspectiva de ‘pluralismo legal’, este cuaderno trata 
de hacer una interpretación de las prácticas sociales alrededor 
de la tierra en una región de la vieja frontera agrícola en Nica-
ragua.IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08 • 
	 	 résumé
Au Nicaragua, le problème de la réforme agraire 
est résolument à l’ordre du jour. Une réforme agraire révolu-
tionnaire suivie d’une redistribution additionnelle des terres et 
d’une libéralisation hâtive des marchés des terres est supposée 
avoir créé une grande instabilité du régime foncier. Selon l’avis 
autorisé reçu, seule une intervention significative de l’état par le 
biais d’un enregistrement complet à grande échelle des titres de 
propriété, peut mettre fin aux disputes incessantes qui engen-
drent l’insécurité autant que l’injustice contre les pauvres béné-
ficiaires de la réforme agraire. Cet avis, inspirée des perspectives 
économiques et légales organisant les droits fonciers, a cepend-
ant été remis en question avec succès dans d’autres contextes 
de développement, particulièrement l’Afrique, où une approche 
légale se révéla être plus adaptée à décrire les processus sociaux 
complexes qui définissent les droits fonciers. 
Cette  approche  plaide  pour  la  nécessité 
d’appréhender les pratiques foncières détaillées là où la légiti-
mité (et donc la sécurité) de l’accès à la terre et le régime foncier 
sont construits socialement, en faisant appel aux sources du 
droit foncier aussi bien étatiques que non-étatiques. Les con-
clusions politiques ne font pas appel à une intervention de l’état 
pour remédier aux pratiques agraires informelles soi-disant cha-
otiques et injustes, mais préconisent plutôt une réorganisation 
institutionnelle qui contribue à une plus grande synergie entre 
différentes sources de droit, réduisant de la sorte les insécurités 
et les injustices dues aux incompatibilités dominantes. 
En s’inspirant de l’approche pluraliste légale, notre arti-
cle constitue un essai d’interprétation des pratiques foncières 
réelles dans une région agricole frontalière au Nicaragua.IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08 • 
1.	 	 IntroduCtIon	
Land property issues remain firmly on the develop-
ment agenda in Nicaragua. A decade of revolutionary land reform, 
followed by additional land redistribution and overnight liberalisa-
tion of land markets in the aftermath of the Sandinista revolution-
ary regime, have created a substantial institutional turmoil which 
is assumed to have caused severe conflict and insecurity of land 
tenancy. Dominant received wisdom (e.g. de Janvry & Sadoulet, 
2000) is that only full-scale land titling with comprehensive reg-
istration can solve these problems by creating clear-cut definitive 
property rights, independently and transparently guaranteed by 
the state legal system. 
The analysis of this paper has grown out of increas-
ing doubts about this received wisdom, partly inspired by the theo-
retical debate about tenure security and legal pluralism that casts 
doubts about simplistic legal solutions to property rights issues 
(Berry, 1993; Lavigne Delville, 1998, 2000; Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan, 
2002) and partly confirmed by field observation that a great many 
peasants, with quite precarious legal rights over their land, did not 
seem to perceive tenure insecurity as a real problem. 
Such also seemed to be the case in the region of Ter-
rabuena2, where we have undertaken our research. Being both an 
(old) agricultural frontier with a highly dynamic land market and 
an area significantly affected by the contra-revolutionary rebellion 
and Sandinista counter-insurgency war in the 1980s, it is a region 
that has suffered from substantial institutional shocks where one 
would expect severe problems related to land. A recent field sur-
vey based on a sample of 1234 landowners, realised by the NGO 
Actuar (see below), found out that only about a third of the local 
land has some kind of public title: 12% have full publicly registered 
titles, 9% have the provisional ‘supplementary title’ (see further) 
and 10% have collective and thus often problematic land reform 
titles. The rest of the land has no (15%) or only non-state private 
(48%) sales-purchase documents. According to the dominant per-
spective on land rights in Nicaragua, the largely non-state, infor-
mal status of local land property rights confirms an urgent need 
for state intervention in order to create legal clarity about tenure. 
Yet, as our study of land rights practices in Terrabuena will show, it 
might be warranted to adopt an alternative, legal pluralistic frame 
of analysis which does not a priori declare this need to replace so-
cially negotiated (insecure?) non-state property rights by allegedly 
neutral (secure?) state-guaranteed legal tenure. 
1  This paper was significantly improved after the incorpora-
tion of valuable comments and suggestions of the reviewers: 
Rikke Broegaard, PhD researcher of the Roskilde University 
Center  and  the  Danish  Institute  for  International  Studies, 
and  Filip  Reyntjens,  professor  at  the  Institute  of  Develop-
ment Policy and Management (IOB), University of Antwerp. 
2  To  guarantee  anonymity  we  intentionally  changed  the 
names of regions, villages and local development organiza-
tions. 8 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08
2.	 	 FrAmework	oF	AnAlysIs
The  theoretical  approach  adopted  in  this  paper 
starts from Amartya Sen’s general understanding of poverty 
and development (Sen, 1999). Sen views development as the 
enhancement of individual freedoms, which are linked to con-
crete capabilities that enable human beings to develop liveli-
hood strategies that shape life as they value it. Poverty then 
needs to be understood as deprivation, i.e. the lack of these 
capabilities. In turn, capabilities are linked to entitlements that 
determine the access to resources, the map of exchange op-
portunities (to convert resources into other valuable goods and 
services) and the opportunities to participate in relevant social 
processes. In rural societies, like the region of Terrabuena, the 
rules of access to land, of course, constitute one of the crucial 
entitlements of the rural population. As we have developed 
elsewhere (Bastiaensen, et al., 2002, 2005), it is crucial to un-
derstand that entitlements are generated through a variety of 
social processes in the local institutional environment, depend-
ing on the prevailing ‘rules of the game’ as they apply to a given 
actor’s social position and identities. Individual entitlements 
and ensuing capabilities are thus to a large degree institution-
ally predetermined. 
However, it is important to see that the institu-
tional environment itself is permanently shaped and reshaped 
through  the  aggregated  actions  of  individual  actors  (Long, 
2001). There is thus a very important feedback-loop from in-
dividual action to the enabling and constraining institutional 
environment, whereby actors renegotiate their social position 
and the rules of entitlement that apply to them. This renegotia-
tion takes place in a variety of ‘political arenas’3 around avail-
able resources either in the form of explicit renegotiation of the 
‘rules of the game’ (e.g. renegotiating property rights to land 
after the war in a village peace commission) or through less 
tangible bargaining at the margin over the interpretation and 
re-enactment of prevailing rules in concrete instances (e.g. in-
formal confirmation of land rights, gradual encroachment of a 
richer onto a poorer farmers’ land, changing rules as applying 
to cattle ranchers’ and farmers’ rights and obligations; terms 
of sharecropping arrangements, …). 
The  ensuing  institutional  organisation  of  access 
to resources and exchange opportunities will have an effect 
on both the ‘size’ and the ‘distribution’ of rural welfare. In the 
case of access to land rights, institutional arrangements will 
3  This concept is taken from Bierschenk and Olivier de Sard-
han (1998:240), who defined “political arena” as “a place of 
concrete confrontation between social actors interacting on 
common issues”. They coined the concept to underline that 
bargaining processes do not only take place within ‘political’ 
bodies, like parliaments or village councils, but in every ‘real’ 
meeting place of actors around resources or opportunities. IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08 • 
determine (in)security of land tenure and thereby influence the 
(in)efficiency of land use and thus the size of rural income. At 
the same time, it will play a crucial role as a major determinant 
of the distribution of rural income and income security.  The on-
going, explicit and implicit, bargaining over (the re-enactment 
of) entitlements also explains why the distribution of the ‘enti-
tlements to participate’ are such an important characteristic of 
the prevailing institutional environment. Indeed, poverty can 
often be related to the deficient participation-capabilities of 
the poor that constrain their voice and bargaining power. Ul-
timately, this brings us to define ‘the poor’ as “essentially those 
human beings who, for one reason or another, almost systematically 
end up at the losing end of the multiple bargains that are struck 
around available resources and opportunities” (Bastiaensen et al, 
2005: 981). As a consequence, poverty reduction ultimately has 
to do with changing “the existing structures of power… to improve 
opportunities for participation and voice and engaging the hitherto 
disadvantaged or disenfranchised in the political process” (Bardhan, 
2002: 202).
The  research  in  this  paper  focuses  on  the  local 
institutional  processes  around  the  conditions  and  security 
of access to land in Terrabuena, Nicaragua. As in many other 
developing countries, we assume that the local institutional 
context should be considered as a kind of ‘institutional land-
scape’,  which  is  complex,  locally  specific,  and  pluriform  or 
polycephalous in nature as it is the product of different histori-
cal periods and referring to varying meaning systems, rules and 
actors (Bierschenk, et al, 2000: 10). It is one of these develop-
ing  regions  where  “many  ballgames  may  be  played  simultane-
ously”, and “numerous systems of justice operate simultaneously” 
(Migdal, 1998: 39). As we illustrate below, one can indeed dis-
cern the presence of competing and/or complementing social 
fields with differential capacities to function as sources of social 
legitimation of land rights. In peasant regions like Terrabuena, 
Migdal’s “many ballgames” obviously also refer to the specific 
and relatively autonomous characteristics of local peasant so-
cieties. It is not by accident that Migdal opens his book with 
a quote from a daily prayer from seventeenth-century French 
peasants: “Deliver us from all evil and from justice.” (Migdal, 1998:
xiii, emphasis added) The peasant’s rejection of the intrusion of 
the national legal system in their affairs, which is expressed in 
this verse, clearly illustrates the historically difficult and often 
antagonistic relations between the developing nation-states 
and local ‘peasant societies’. The latter can be characterised 
as ‘part societies with part cultures’ (Shanin, 1987: 358), indicating 10 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08
their ambiguous status as belonging to the broader dominant 
society, while at the same time maintaining (and defending) a 
relative self-reliance and autonomy.
Since  the  Terrabuena  region,  as  an  agricultural 
frontier area, historically has been one of the strongholds of 
peasant resistance4 as well as a region of practical escape from 
the dominant, estate-dominated rural economy, antagonism 
and resistance to the intruding Nicaraguan state is clearly one 
of the defining lines of its local history. Any reflection on the 
institutional processes that shape and reshape property rela-
tions to land therefore has to take this antagonism seriously. 
Especially in this historical context, it would be a critical er-
ror to assume (or claim) that the state has (or should have) a 
monopoly as sole norm provider and is (or should be) capable 
to use the law as an instrument of social engineering.5 In this 
paper, we therefore follow Sally Moore’s lead on the restrict-
ed capacity of the state to define rights and exercise effective 
coercion (Moore, 1978). The state is rather to be considered as 
one of the possible providers of norms and coercion, besides 
other “semi-autonomous social fields” with the capacity to gener-
ate rules-cum-enforcement and (to some extent) “to dictate the 
mode of compliance or non-compliance to state-made legal rules” 
(Moore, 1978: 57). 
This brings us to the acknowledgement of a situ-
ation of ‘legal pluralism’, i.e. “the co-existence and interaction of 
multiple  legal  orders  within  a  social  setting.”  (Meinzen-Dick  & 
Pradhan, 2002: 4). Law provided by legal or administrative sys-
tems (state law), functions side by side with non-state law,6 i.e. 
rules and norms that are generated by social fields outside the 
state. Important in legal pluralism is the recognition of interac-
tion and mutual interference between the rule-making systems 
(Moore, 1978: 55-56). According to Chauveau who quotes Berry 
and Bailey, “we witness a ‘proliferation of institutions’ (Berry), which 
results in a ‘diversity of arenas of confrontation-negotiation’ (Bailey) 
corresponding to levels (local, regional, national) and specific regula-
tion norms issued from actors’ interrelations” (Chauveau, 1998b:73, 
own translation). This view is in line with Migdal’s above-men-
tioned description of the polycephalous institutional landscape 
in which ‘many ballgames’ are played simultaneously and in 
interaction with each other. 
Given  this  presence  of  legal  pluralism,  how  are 
property rights to land obtained and once obtained, how can 
they be secured with sufficient certainty? A first point to be made 
4  The region of Terrabuena formed an important breeding-
ground for US-sponsored peasant contra-revolutionary guer-
rillas of the 1980s.
5  This vision corresponds to a hierarchical approach to the 
legal sphere, which claims a ‘natural’ supremacy for the state 
as the ultimate source and guarantor of the rule of law. It also 
assumes a direct causal link between the injection of law in 
a given system and corresponding changes of human behav-
iour, ignoring the possibility of the informal (re)processing of 
rules during the interpretation and implementation phase. 
(see Moore, 1978: 54-5)
6  Other terms can be used to designate non-state law. Some 
speak of customary law (Moore, 1978), indigenous legal sys-
tem (Uwazie, 1994) or traditional law (Von Benda- Beckmann, 
1995). IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08 • 11
here is that land rights always need to be actively claimed and 
(re)performed by social actors (users, owners). The rules of en-
titlement to land are constantly renegotiated and reperformed 
in ‘political arenas’, where actors need to mobilise legitimacy 
and support from other actors in order to be able to defend 
their claims. In order to be able to do so, their claims need to 
be grounded in certain rules of entitlement, which are the true 
origin of the acquired right and its legitimacy (Chaveau, 1998b). 
Claims of property rights need to be substantiated with refer-
ences to underlying principles and rules of entitlement associ-
ated with one or more relevant social fields, which themselves 
can  be  and  are  subject  of  constant  renegotiation  (Chaveau, 
1998b: 73).7 In a context of legal pluralism, actors trying to ac-
quire or secure property rights to land, can and do make use 
of more than one rule system to legitimate their land claims. 
What is important to acknowledge here is that they have to de-
vise discursive and other strategies to corroborate and make 
relevant others respect their claims, especially in cases where 
their rights may be at risk. “Which specific repertoire, in which spe-
cific case, people will orient themselves to, will mostly be a matter 
of expediency, of local knowledge, perceived context of interaction, 
and power relations.” (Spiertz, quoted in Meinzen-Dick& Prad-
han, 2002: 5) In this context, Lund (2001) and Meinzen-Dick 
& Pradhan (2002: 5), in line with von Benda-Beckmann (1995), 
point at the possibility of ‘forum shopping’ where actors try to 
justify claims and generate or avoid enforcement by mobilising 
different sources of legitimacy and enforcement mechanisms 
that suit them best. 
Therefore, in the everyday life of communities one 
finds a complex and ever changing mixture of several norma-
tive orders, linked to an underlying process of explicit or implicit 
negotiation over access rights to land. In the final analysis, it 
will be people’s quality of participation in local arenas that will 
to a large extent define the rules that they can mobilise to le-
gitimate their claims or not. Their capacity to exercise claims 
is therefore “closely linked to membership in social networks and 
participation in both formal and informal political processes” (Berry, 
1993: 104). Or put in other terms, it is to a large extent the enti-
tlements and capabilities of participation, i.e. the power and ca-
pacity to exert socio-political influence,  which will determine 
the entitlements to land. 
Especially from a traditional economics or juridical 
point of view, such a dynamic view of continuously renegotiated 
property rights could appear to entail permanent insecurity of 
7  Unlike most of the literature on property rights, this view 
also brings Chaveau to develop a positive appreciation of 
conflicts over land: “(C)onflicts are not seen as a default of 
the regulation system but rather as the lively part of the sys-
tem” (Chauveau, 1998: 73)12 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08
land tenure – and for a real outsider it might indeed be. How-
ever, as Lavinge Delville (1998:77) underlines, security of tenure 
is never absolute and even when locally negotiated property 
rights might not be guaranteed for eternity, they are neither 
radically  unstable.  Therefore  they  often  provide  more  than 
sufficient tenure security in order not to hamper (long term) 
investment (Lavigne Delville, 1998: 264-292). Furthermore and 
perhaps most importantly, one should neither automatically 
suppose that state-defined property rights manage to secure 
rights better, unless there would be a clearly demonstrated ca-
pacity of the state to impose and enforce its rule of law – some-
thing which is far from evident in general and even less so in 
agricultural frontier regions like Terrabuena. 
If we look in more practical terms to the processes 
that create property rights in Terrabuena or elsewhere, there 
are two broad ways to acquire access rights to land. The first 
way is to acquire rights through locally sanctioned institutional 
processes that refer to the underlying principles and rules of en-
titlement in the agricultural frontier. In practice, these will refer 
to the original process of colonisation and to subsequent inher-
itance or purchases/sales of land and improvements (see § 3.1 
for further elaboration). Those are the rights that are “ratified by 
the neighbourhood and are anchored in the local social capital” (de 
Janvry & Sadoulet, 2000: 17). The second way is the so-called 
‘administrative way’ resulting from state recognition or (re-)def-
inition through laws or administrative decisions. 
As de Janvry and Sadoulet (2000: 17) indicate, re-
ferring to the underlying studies made by IRAM (2000a, b) for 
the case of Nicaragua, informal use rights (derechos de posesión) 
vested in ‘local social capital’ tend to show significantly less 
conflicts and thus more security of tenure than most of the 
state-defined property rights, including rights that do not re-
fer to the more problematic agrarian reform problem. Despite 
unequivocal suggestions to the contrary in the IRAM-study, for 
these authors this does however not contradict the necessity to 
engage in comprehensive state-led land titling, since they im-
plicitly suppose that only state-organised titling is able to solve 
the problem of contested property rights (de Janvry & Sadoulet, 
2000: 17), while they further believe that also for the nowadays 
non-contested properties state-law will gradually substitute 
informal processes “as time passes by” (de Janvry & Sadoulet, 
2000: 19). This view, which inspires much of present-day land 
titling policies,8 is possibly an indication of an economist’s ap-
proach to the property right issue. As Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan 
8  The study by IRAM and de Janvry & Sadoulet was one of 
the important inputs in the preparation of the national land 
titling policy, co-financed by the World Bank.IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08 • 1
(2000: 14) observed “economists seek to reduce pluralism and con-
solidate all under a unitary rule of (state) law”.  
Following  our  analysis  above,  the  legal  recogni-
tion and cadastral registration approach argued for by de Jan-
vry and Sadoulet (2000), and subsequently implemented under 
the PRODEP nation-wide titling project, is highly overoptimis-
tic about the capacity of the (Nicaraguan) state’s capacity to 
define and permanently safeguard clear land property titles.9 
In  fact,  state-defined  property  rights  will  be  in  need  of  lo-
cal non-state ‘revisiting’ and reprocessing in order to become 
fully accepted, so it is not quite clear how they would have a 
superior capacity to put a ‘final end’ to property rights conflicts. 
Indeed, it is quite probable that “as time passes by” non-state 
institutional processes also have a significant potential to solve 
property rights conflicts. Furthermore, a possibility exists that 
precisely the intrusion of the state in these informal processes 
might exacerbate, rather than reduce property rights conflicts 
and insecurity. “In some contexts of social and political change, le-
gal pluralism can increase uncertainty for resource users. This is es-
pecially so when statutory law does not recognize customary rights, 
and those with greater political connections, knowledge of state law, 
or access to the courts use state law to override customary rights, in 
order to capture resources” (Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan, 2002: 13). 
All these observations cast some doubts on the effectiveness of 
the policy conclusion that comprehensive state-led land titling 
is necessary and able to put a final end to land tenure insecurity 
in Nicaragua, and especially in the more remote peasant com-
munities of the ‘Interior’. 
This paper does not try to give a final answer to 
this fundamental question about land policy in Nicaragua. Our 
point of departure is rather that there is a great need for further 
and more detailed studies about everyday practices of land 
rights creation and management in Nicaraguan rural communi-
ties. As observed by de Laiglesia (2003: 7), these processes are 
not yet well documented in the Nicaraguan and Latin Ameri-
can context (as compared with the African context). A better 
understanding of local practices might shed new light on the 
policy issues, especially in view of the unavoidable limitations 
of the real world Nicaraguan state apparatus and the social ne-
gotiation processes surrounding its operations. In what follows, 
we will present a tentative interpretation of the local land right 
practices in a sample of villages belonging to the municipality 
of Terrabuena. It is important to stress that we do not claim to 
say the final word on the political arenas around land in Ter-
 
9  de Janvry & Sadoulet (2000: 20) are extremely optimistic 
about the administrative capacity of the Nicaraguan state. 
This becomes very clear when they discuss IRAM’s recom-
mendation that the complexity and superposition of different 
property and use rights on the same plots of land should be 
recognised. In fact, they fully embrace this recommendation 
and accept that the usual land titling process often creates 
problems since it ignores this complexity and superposition 
by giving a ‘total’ title to one of the owners.  Their conclusion 
is however not that such issues can best be managed through 
flexible locally negotiated processes, as e.g. Chaveau (1998) 
recommends. In contrast, they conclude that the state-led 
comprehensive land titling process should take due account 
of these different rights and recognise them in a fine-tuned 
land registry (which as we know should be permanently up-
dated). This conclusion however sounds rather surrealistic 
when compared with actual practice. We were told, for exam-
ple, that peasants in a village of Somotillo complained (and 
were indeed quite worried) that they weren’t even present 
when the surveyors of the state titling project, PRODEP, came 
by to measure their plots. 1 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08
rabuena, since with each step we took in the deciphering of the 
complexity of the land right practices we discovered new com-
plexities and further questions emerging. 
The information underlying this paper has been 
gathered in a number of field trips of relatively short duration, 
undertaken by the authors during the period 2001-2006, add-
ing up to some 12 weeks of local presence in total. We adopted 
an exploratory, qualitative research approach, focused on field 
observations as well as open and semi-structured interviews 
with key actors and common (peasant) stakeholders. To the 
extent possible, information thus obtained was triangulated 
with that of other informants as well as the scarcely available 
documental resources. Additional insights were obtained from 
interviews with Miguel Alemán and Lea Montes of the Instituto 
Nitlapán in Nicaragua. The former has undertaken substantial 
field research in the region (part of it together with the authors) 
and the latter is a notary and director of the land property 
rights program of Nitlapán, and thus quite acquainted with es-
pecially the legal issues involved. The choice of the study region 
was not made in view of representativity. In fact, the decision 
to study land rights arenas followed previous research focused 
on policy interests related to rural finance.10 We do however not 
claim any representativity and a fuller and ‘less interpretative’ 
account of the issues that will be raised would certainly require 
a much longer-term, intense field research than we could do in 
this context. Therefore, our paper modestly restricts its ambi-
tions to providing an attempt to illustrate the potential of an 
– at least in Nicaragua- uncommon way of looking at the issues 
surrounding land property rights.
10  We are convinced, however, that the region is quite rep-
resentative for the strongly war-affected agricultural frontier 
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3.	 	 A	generAl	InterpretAtIon	oF	lAnd	rIghts		
	 	 	 proCesses	In	terrAbuenA
Before the presentation of the case-studies, it is 
necessary to further specify the general perspectives on land 
right practices in a context of legal pluralism as they apply to 
the specific agricultural frontier context of Terrabuena. There-
fore, we first try to develop a general reading of some of the rules 
of entitlement to land as they present themselves in relation to 
the different – state and non-state – sources of property rights. 
We frame our analysis – even though this is certainly an unwar-
ranted simplification of a more complex reality – by considering 
two ‘semi-autonomous social fields’: the state and the peasant 
society of the Nicaraguan agricultural frontier. The case-stud-
ies will then describe how different actors in the specific con-
text of the villages develop their strategies to access land and 
secure their property rights by moving back and forth between 
the different repertoires of both types of sources of rights and 
legitimacy.
3.1.    In search of the principles of entitlement to land  
      in the agricultural frontier
Even  though  Terrabuena  belongs  to  the  old  ag-
ricultural  frontier  (Marchetti  &  Maldidier,  1996),  initially  be-
ing colonised during the first decades of the 19th century, the 
migration/colonization logic and related peasant worldviews 
and ideologies still remain an important reference in everyday 
life. As we have already indicated above, this is among others 
exemplified  by  its  ancient  and  recent  history  of  peasant  re-
sistance to the intruding nation state. Even though a recently 
initiated process of decentralisation brought state authorities 
somewhat closer to local societies, we can still assume that 
Terrabuena maintains much of its agricultural frontier charac-
ter as an “institutional barrier quite far from established country in-
frastructure (...) in which there is little state presence” (Baumeister 
& Fernandez, 2005: 80).
In the Nicaraguan agrarian frontier region several 
socially accepted “routines” can be identified that have the 
potential to create and/or maintain locally legitimated land 
ownership. Being an area of colonization, a first source of en-
titlement to a specific plot of land is the act of – if nowadays 
often imaginary – colonization itself: the conquering of the sav-
age and unproductive forest land in order to make it suitable for 
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is strongly related to the concept of ‘improvements’ (‘mejoras’), 
which are precisely those ‘investments’ in the (forest) land that 
allow the virgin land to be put to a productive use.  Even when 
a peasant would turn out not to have the right to continue ex-
ploiting a certain piece of land, e.g. because it belongs to a nat-
ural reservation area, he nevertheless always remains owner of 
the ‘improvements’ and thus entitled to receive compensation 
should he be ‘expropriated’.11 
There are also indications that the initial ‘improve-
ments’ do not lead to a permanent and complete property right 
over  the  land.  The  latter  remains  conditional  upon  the  con-
tinuing productive use of the underlying resource. Indeed, today 
most of the land in the area has been cleared decades ago, but 
it  still  requires  substantial  labour-intensive  maintenance  to 
keep it productive, especially for agricultural purposes (weed 
removal, fertility maintenance).  The capacity to demonstrate 
the ability as a productive farmer constitutes a second princi-
ple of entitlement to land. The ideology of the mestizo-peas-
ants is linked to a strong work ethic, which cherishes personal 
work effort as the basis of individual success and advancement, 
and where additional advantage or disadvantage is held to be 
granted by ‘divine justice’ only (Ciera, 1989: 297). In this per-
spective, the “finqueros” constitute a clear role-model for all 
peasants in the agricultural frontier. Finqueros are peasants 
who, thanks to their hard work and initial capital, could accu-
mulate land and develop productive, well-stocked farms. Rath-
er than being a source of envy, triggering the contestation of 
their rights to land, it is precisely their economic success that 
sustains their claims to the land.12 The principle of the capacity 
to make the land produce as a source of claims to land is also 
illustrated by the difficulties to assimilate the concept of ‘land 
rental’. In fact, beyond share-cropping, which is a temporary 
joint venture to cultivate the land in which the owner continues 
to assume some responsibility to work the land, land rental is 
problematic since the tenant undermines the owners’ right to 
land by demonstrating his capacity to cultivate it, especially if 
the rental is long-term and the tenant begins to undertake land-
improving investments.
The legitimization of land property rights not only 
relates to the capacity to use the land resources productively, 
but also to the ability of the more successful local actors (ini-
tially finqueros) to assume responsibility – as a patron – for 
their poorer peasant neighbours/constituency. In the past, fin-
queros were providing ‘their’ smaller peasants with opportuni-
11  This agricultural frontier logic is quite at odds with the logic 
of conservationists who see peasant migrants as encroach-
ing upon and destroying the – in their eyes –  valuable tropi-
cal forest. Viewed from a certain urban “social field” with its 
‘green values’, compensating peasants for destruction of na-
ture is of course a bizarre idea.
12  This is one of the main areas of contradiction between the 
Sandinista class logic, with its suspicion of richer peasants 
(finqueros), and the peasant logic of the agricultural frontier.
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ties for casual labour, access to additional land (sharecropping) 
or pasture (grazing rights for peasant cows), transport services, 
help in relations with local authorities, emergency aid, etc…
Due to this cultural background, it is important to stress that 
patronage, ensuing spontaneously from the control over land 
and external contacts, is not perceived as a permanent obsta-
cle for the advancement of the dependent peasant to a status 
that resembles that of the finquero, but rather as a viable road 
to individual social mobility explained by the finqueros’ role in 
granting access to resources and markets. Cultural proximity 
due to the peasant origin of the finqueros as well as real-world 
success stories of a limited number of upwardly mobile, former-
ly dependent peasants confirm the role of the finqueros as a 
role model and a helping hand in social mobility, and thus the 
necessity to respect their (and others’) property rights to land. 
Patronage therefore constitutes a third principle of entitlement 
to land, reinforcing the rights derived from economic capacity. 
Entitlements to land in the agricultural frontier region are in-
deed embedded in a social order characterised by “relations of 
patronage, in which power resides with those who have access to 
land, cattle and the market.” (CIERA, 1989: 297) 
A fourth source of entitlement to land is derived 
from the purchase of property rights. Since the agricultural 
frontier is a very dynamic region of in- and out-migration, it is 
also characterised by an active land market. Land property and 
land improvements are readily and easily transferred from one 
owner to another by means of purchase. Capital used to buy 
land is normally viewed as coming from legitimate proceeds 
of previous efforts and performance in the same region (if the 
buyer is from the community) or from elsewhere (if the buyer is 
an outsider). Land acquired through an act of buying thereby 
generates a locally legitimate property right, provided the new 
owner demonstrates capacity to use the resource productively 
and – if he is rich – even more so if he assumes his patronage re-
sponsibilities. Besides land purchases, inheritance from father 
to sons is of course a further (fifth) legitimated way of transfer-
ring land to new owners,13 but here also there is an additional 
provision to demonstrate capacity to work and ‘love’ the farm. 
Peasants need to educate their sons in the peasant way of do-
ing things and in particular it is critical that they learn “to earn 
what they have”: ‘que les cueste lo que tienen” (CIERA: 1988: 
300).
13 Take  note  that  women  do  not  usually  have  inheritance 
rights to land in the traditional rural society of Nicaragua.
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3.2.    The role of the state: from recognition of
     unofficial local rights to outright intrusion
Mechanisms to legalise non-state rights
Nicaraguan law and legal practice have tradition-
ally included mechanisms that allow the gradual formal recog-
nition of informal property rights (on demand), especially those 
generated in the agricultural frontier where the state’s pres-
ence is historically weak. A legally recognised property title 
often becomes useful at a certain moment in time, in particu-
lar to access credit from formal banks and historically usually 
for the larger land owners (finqueros and entrepreneurs). The 
legal provision of the ‘titulo supletorio’ (supplementary title) 
provides a mechanism to legalise ‘de facto rights of possession’ 
over time, by means of the public recognition of uncontested 
land possession. In its essence, this mechanism requires the 
confirmation – by means of testimonies – of an uncontested 
and active, i.e. productive utilization of the land resource, be-
longing to the public domain (and thus without any previous 
private or collective property right status, nor record in the 
land registry) (IRAM, 2000a: 85-86). As time passes by without 
any contestation of the possession, registered by the ‘titulo su-
pletorio’, it gradually gains in legal strength as against future 
contestation by third parties.14 Especially in the case of a legally 
registered sales operation to cancel outstanding debts, these 
rights can easily be transferred to a new owner, which is why 
banks or microfinance institutions may accept these titles as 
collateral (although formal banks usually do not).
Another procedure to provide public backing of un-
official property documents is to look for some kind of public 
recognition or even ‘registration’ of the private sales/purchase 
documents. Producers who buy land unofficially usually have a 
private document – the “promesa de venta” – wherein the seller 
confirms the purchase transaction in favour of the new owner. 
Often these new owners try to improve the ‘public’ status of 
these private documents, e.g. by asking the local community 
leader or other personalities to be a witness to the transaction 
or in exceptional cases even by registering it in informal com-
munity plans or in a municipal registry (which exists for local 
fiscal reasons).  It is also possible to register the right of posses-
sion, derived from such unofficial transactions, with a notary. 
In the present-day context, one must also empha-
size that from a purely state legal point of view, two broad types 
14 There are no clear legal provisions about a minimum length 
of time required; in case of conflict it will be up to the court to 
ratify or reject the legitimacy of the contested property right.
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of property rights circumstances should be distinguished, each 
with quite different problems and ways to solve them. The first 
type consists of land that has no previous legal history. Such 
land can be legally attributed by the rather simple mechanism 
of the ‘titulo supletorio’, which only requires the intervention of 
the local judge. The second type relates to land with a legal his-
tory, which applies to most of the agrarian reform land and some 
areas of communal property (‘tierras ejidales’). In this case, the 
easier road of ‘legalization’ through the ‘titulo supletorio’ is in 
theory no longer possible, and a much more complicated exer-
cise to create individual property rights for the present-day de 
facto  owners  becomes  unavoidable  under  current  legal  pro-
cedures.15 For the agrarian reform cooperatives, the property 
rights must be traced back to the previous owner; today’s mem-
bership needs to be legally recognised as those entitled to the 
collective property (net of any collective debts); and individual 
plots need to be established with precision. This second road to 
legalisation is obviously quite complex and expensive, as it in-
evitably involves state institutions at departmental (and some-
times even national) level. An additional difficulty is that some 
of the cooperatives do not possess a legal personality and the 
land is registered in the name of one or more natural persons 
(usually the cooperative’s leadership). Except for a voluntary 
transfer of this land from the official owners to the entitled ben-
eficiaries, whether or not induced by social pressure from below, 
there are no legal solutions to this problem. In the case of com-
munal property, no official road to individualise property rights 
seems to exist.
Both in the (changing) legal provisions and even 
more in actual ‘legal’ practice one should also note that the dif-
ferent routes and mechanisms of state legalisation-registration 
are not always very clearly defined, nor unequivocally applied, 
nor for that matter always mutually compatible and coherent. 
This implies that the different mechanisms of state legitimiza-
tion/recognition of non-state property rights should certainly 
not be viewed as an unequivocal mechanism with superior ca-
pacity to define and enforce property rights. Without the back-
ing of local legitimating processes, the official legal status of 
land is usually of little value and if it has some value it often 
contributes to tenure insecurity by creating contradicting claims 
to land in the presence of competing normative registers. The 
lack of clarity in legal provisions and practices also provides am-
ple opportunities for manipulation of the process – especially by 
more powerful and better informed parties.16
15  It should be stressed that in practice a lot of irregularities 
can be observed, since often previous records of private or 
other property rights have not been updated or lost. (Thanks 
to R. Broegaard for this observation.)
 
16 Complaints and evidence of widespread, gross abuses of 
peasant ignorance (e.g. by lawyers) in the legal arenas around 
land abound (de Janvry & Sadoulet, 2000: 12). This evidently 
does not contribute to strengthen peasant confidence and 
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     State intervention through land reform
Besides  providing  these  legal  procedures  which 
are – at least in principle – complementary and supportive of 
local land rights, from the 1980s onward the state has also en-
gaged in an agrarian reform process that deliberately tried to 
correct the unequal and allegedly unjust property relations and 
thus overtly violated several principles of entitlements to land 
in agricultural frontier regions like Terrabuena. The Sandinista 
agrarian reform began by confiscating properties of dictator 
Somoza and other people that had left the country, and used 
the properties to set up mainly state farms and production 
cooperatives. With time, an increasing number of additional 
landowners were affected as new criteria were added to jus-
tify expropriations (idle land, land exploited inefficiently, public 
utility, social interest).17 When landowners were expropriated, 
they sometimes received other land in exchange (“permuta”) 
or were compensated financially. 
There was however a lack of clear regulation so that 
a lot of arbitrary political decisions were made with different 
owners receiving different (or even no) compensation according 
to the particular circumstances.18 Systematic registration was 
not a concern during the Sandinista era. In fact, “only 27% of 
land in the reform sector received a title” and most of the docu-
ments provided were ‘provisional agrarian reform titles’ (de Groot, 
1994: 108). This incomplete registration and the contested na-
ture of the state-provided property rights (see below) made the 
agrarian reform process rapidly run into serious problems after 
the unexpected Sandinista electoral defeat. This could not be 
prevented by the emergency law n°88 from April 2th 1990 (de 
Groot, 1994: 109) that the Sandinista government promulgated 
before the handover of their power to the newly elected liberal 
government, in an attempt to secure the more equal land distri-
bution produced by the agrarian reform. 
Especially  in  the  initial  period,  the  Sandinistas 
imposed a model of state or collective cooperative production 
which disturbed the old patterns and principles of patronage 
– substituting them with a new form of state paternalism – and 
radically cut off the dream of individual advancement to “fin-
quero” status (Horton, 1998). (See also discussion on page 11 
and 12 about principles of patronage). In fact, being – at least 
potentially – a prototype of the ‘capitalist class enemy’, the fin-
queros represented a social class to be viewed with suspicion 
(Bastiaensen, 1991). These policies by the revolutionary Sandi-
17  Occasionally, cases of expropriation for outright political 
reasons have also been reported.
18 People  accused  of  collaborating  with  the  counterrevolu-
tion were usually expropriated without any compensation, 
whereas landowners that were affected to respond to a ‘so-
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nista regime rapidly transformed the initial sympathy for the 
revolution into widespread distrust and – triggered by US mili-
tary support – also into overt and substantial armed resistance. 
As Horton (1998: 95-97) indicates for the region of Quilalí, lo-
cal finquero leaders, using their ideological and practical influ-
ence over dependent peasants, played a crucial part in creating 
and organising the local peasant basis for the resistance and 
the armed struggle. Viewed from the logic of the agricultural 
frontier, the Sandinista agrarian reform was perceived as a life-
threatening attack on the basic values and principles of peas-
ant society. The Sandinista reform of land tenure rights was 
rejected as completely illegitimate, threatening to take away 
the land from owners that had earned it through hard work and 
who often played a crucial role in the survival and development 
opportunities of the smaller peasants.19
The reform also lacked legitimacy, since the new 
owners received the land totally for free and were bereft of their 
autonomy as individual producers, being almost completely de-
pendent upon the directives of the Ministry of Agriculture which 
acts as a kind of national planning agency. Furthermore, the 
cooperatives were usually obliged to engage in mono-cultiva-
tion of staple foods (corn) and to shift to ‘modern’ mechanised 
and input-intensive technology. Also because of the Sandinista 
policies of controlled and low official food prices (Spoor et al, 
1989), financial losses were quite common, but systematically 
compensated by input subsidies and cheap credit-cum-yearly 
remission of outstanding debts (Bastiaensen, 2000: 155). 
Yet, viewed from another perspective, the Sandini-
sta state farms and cooperatives were not such a fundamental 
break away from the previous society in the sense that they pre-
served the paternalistic-authoritarian rural governance struc-
tures, be it in a new fashion. In a way, this new state patron 
was far more benevolent and protective than the previous one 
– providing access to guaranteed food packages, schools and 
health facilities – especially attractive for the poorer peasants 
(Ruben, 1997) Yet, due to bureaucratic rigidities and organisa-
tional problems it did not always suit (poor) peasants’ needs in 
an equally effective and flexible way. Also, more fundamentally, 
it did radically cut off the road towards a future as a successful, 
individual finquero farmer.
It is important to stress that – as before – patron-
age was at the heart of the national and local power structure. 
Local patrons – now more political figures – exercised their 
19 Purposeful  manipulation  of  these  perceptions  were  of 
course present, since the Sandinistas did not usually focus 
their expropriations on the finquero owners that had not fled 
the country –although some notable exceptions might have 
been of great practical and ideological value for those who 
fuelled  the  discourse  of  communist  disrespect  for  private 
property.
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power serving as intermediaries of the national state towards 
local clients; whereas national control is maintained indirectly 
through these local representatives and their dependence on 
resources provided by the state. In this perspective, it is worth-
while to note that the strategy not to legalise agrarian reform 
land  rights  (and  even  more  not  to  attribute  individual  land 
rights) is quite congruent with traditional state-dependent cli-
entelistic power mechanisms in the sense that the state always 
retains the authority to recall the rights it has extended to the 
agrarian reform beneficiaries. As a consequence, the latter re-
main in a kind of permanent loyalty debt towards the state and 
its local intermediaries. Viewed from this perspective, it is also 
much less surprising to find the high rotation of membership 
in most agrarian reform cooperatives. Members were indeed 
never close to be real (individual) owners to the land.
How deep-rooted the patronage and authoritar-
ian-clientelistic power structures really are, is best illustrated 
by the historical irony of the post-Sandinista agrarian reform. 
In fact, the contra-rebellion, which in part emerged as a re-
action against a Sandinista agrarian reform that was deemed 
to threaten the peasant way of life, ended in a peace-process 
which paradoxically comprised an additional agrarian reform 
to (re)settle many of the landless young guerrilla-fighters and 
army soldiers. In Terrabuena, part of this additional agrarian re-
form was forced through the violent occupation of state and co-
operative land under the leadership of ex-contra commanders. 
Given the anti-communist ideology of the contras and the new 
government, one would of course have expected a straightfor-
ward model of land redistribution to individual peasant owners, 
but surprisingly the post-Sandinista agrarian reform followed a 
comparable cooperative model, paradoxically receiving a lot of 
support from the resettling politico-military leaders of the con-
tra-forces who apparently understood the advantage in view of 
maintaining their stronghold over ‘their’ people.  This is a clear 
illustration of Marchetti’s conclusion about the tenacity of the 
authoritarian patron-client legacy in the Nicaraguan rural soci-
ety: “The traditional consensus reproduces itself under the umbrella 
of whatever political or ideological rhetoric” (Marchetti, 1994: 194). 
After the war, small ‘Sandinista’ and ‘contra’ peasants-agrar-
ian reform beneficiaries therefore found themselves quite logi-
cally in a similar struggle to secure their individual claims to the 
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3.3.     Important social actors within the political 
     arenas around land property
Now that we have a grasp of the broad principles 
and processes of property rights practises in Terrabuena, we 
need to introduce a brief typology of actors that play a rel-
evant role in the real world political arenas around land prop-
erty before turning to the case-studies. Since property rights 
have to be secured by referring to both the local and national 
norm-generating spheres and instances, most of them oper-
ate as intermediaries that link producer-owners with both the 
community and the ‘outside’. They are a kind of ‘brokers at the 
interface’ and function as important articulation points of the 
prevailing social fields and their discursive practices. We first 
describe those actors who function mainly at the community 
level and who link ‘bottom-up’ with actors situated at the mu-
nicipal level and beyond. Secondly, we indicate those actors 
that belong to institutions operating at the municipal level or 
beyond, and who reach out into the community level through 
their operations.
At the community level, key actors are local com-
munity leaders, the “facilitador judicial rural” (FJR), the “pro-
motor juridico”, and the “seguridad ciudadana”.  Local leaders, 
officially appointed and/or recognised by the Terrabuena mu-
nicipality, are key multifunctional brokers and gatekeepers to 
the community around whom all the other actors mentioned 
above articulate. Sometimes they are elected in a local demo-
cratic and secret voting process. In other cases they are elected 
in a public process of ‘hand raising’ or sometimes simply ap-
pointed by the Mayor without any local election at all. In areas 
with a high incidence of Sandinista or post-Sandinista agrarian 
reform, these local leaders are practically always historically 
dominant leader-members of the ex-cooperatives. Partially de-
pending on the way in which they have ‘gained office’, but also 
as a function of their perceived performance for the community, 
local leaders enjoy more or less local legitimacy in their com-
munity. When there is congruence between the ‘natural’ com-
munity leader and the (liberal) political colour of the municipal-
ity, brokerage usually functions best and local leaders will have 
less  difficulties  to  deliver  on  the  communities’  expectations 
and thus maintain and deepen local legitimacy, unless leaders 
are incompetent or excessively corrupt. When such congruence 
does not exist, Sandinista local leaders tend to confront the lib-
eral municipality, which often leads to strained and less effec-
tive brokerage relationships with the municipality and the state 2 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08
at the local level. Often this can be compensated by their better 
relations with NGO sectors or higher levels of state organisa-
tion where Sandinista influence is stronger. In certain cases, 
the liberal mayor – in an attempt to increase his local political 
influence – may also be tempted to ‘undemocratically’ impose 
a liberal community leader. Such a leader then usually faces 
fierce competition by Sandinista opponents, but may manage 
to gain legitimacy by ‘delivering’ to the community through the 
brokerage links with the municipality. Whatever the political 
constellation, local leaders are always officially linked to the 
municipality since they are the lowest level of state represen-
tation through which the ‘state’ acknowledges local leadership 
in view of creating a functional bridge between ‘municipality’ 
and  ‘community’.20  When  local  leaders  mediate  in  conflicts 
over land property rights, they usually have to bridge the gap 
between state and local law, often tending more towards the 
recognition of the latter.
Besides the multifunctional local leader, we also 
find the “facilitador judicial rural” who mediates in all kinds of 
conflicts and spreads information on different legal and gen-
eral interest topics (e.g. intra-family violence, alcoholism) and 
who is often in charge of several communities at once. The FJR 
depends on the municipality and is trained by the local judge. 
His role is similar to that of the “promotor juridico”, a function 
which is tied to the intervention of the NGO Actuar in 13 com-
munities and is not linked to the municipality.  Finally, a lim-
ited role is sometimes played in property rights conflicts by the 
“seguridad ciudadana”, which is linked to the local police at the 
municipal level. 
In one way or another, all these local actors in 
their different guises and at different moments and places, play 
a role in local arenas to resolve claims and counterclaims or to 
prevent or mediate conflicts. They are all linked with different 
public institutions (municipality, local judge, and local police) 
at the municipal level, with the NGO Actuar functioning as a 
parallel structure, enjoying different levels of local acceptation 
and legitimacy. If these local actors are not capable of resolving 
the issues at hand in a satisfactory manner, they have the pos-
sibility to refer cases to the local judge or to the “commission de 
paz” (peace commission, see below for details) at the municipal 
level. Both have the capacity to arbitrate local cases without 
necessarily calling upon state law, but rather by forging and ac-
knowledging agreements on which the different parties agree 
locally.
20    In  cases  of  outright  political  opposition  between  the 
Mayor and the local leader, the Mayor might be tempted to 
appoint his own representatives, trying to strengthen the op-
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At the municipal level, other local institutions par-
ticipate in political arenas around land although it is worth 
mentioning they usually offer a wider range of services.21 First 
of all, there are a number of service cooperatives22 in Terrabue-
na, (the Asociación de Ganaderos y Agrícultores de Terrabuena 
(AGAT), the San Fernando, 16 de Septiembre) that were born in 
the second half of the 1990s and that are of Sandinista political 
orientation. Out of these, largest is the AGAT which was formed 
in  1995  and  comprises  11  ex-agrarian  reform  cooperatives  in 
Valle de Bernardo and the rest of the valley region. Alongside 
the Sandinista cooperatives, there is also the Cooperativa de la 
Resistencia (or CoResist) which was created as a result of land 
occupations  by  ex-combatants  of  the  contra-resistance  and 
which is headed by former resistance leaders. Besides these 
cooperatives, there is also the Fondo de Desarrollo Local, a 
market-based credit institution with significant operations in 
Terrabuena. All of these institutions, except the San Fernando 
cooperative, provide some kind of legalization services, but it 
is interesting to note that they do not justify them in the same 
way. 
The AGAT emphasizes the importance of legaliza-
tion to protect small peasants since they assume legalization 
is currently only accessible to large landowners and therefore 
used and abused by these in their process of land re-concen-
tration. A legal, individual title is therefore perceived as a ne-
cessity to safeguard land ownership of all the agrarian reform 
beneficiaries. According to our information from the CoResist, 
legalization is also necessary in order to guarantee the inher-
itance rights of women and children. Both FDL and the ‘16 de 
Septiembre’ cooperative, that run substantial credit operations, 
promote legalization in the context of generating reliable collat-
eral to guarantee investment loans. In the 16 de Septiembre co-
operative clients are obliged to follow the internal legalisation 
process for loans above C$ 70,000 (about US$ 4,500). Similar 
thresholds exist in the FDL, where access to smaller amounts 
of loans also becomes easier and more flexible for clients with 
a title, since they no longer need to find a co-guarantor, provid-
ing bail, and usually a richer local patron (from whose influence 
they often want to free themselves). In actual practice, both 
the 16 de Septiembre and FDL legalization process are mainly 
confined to the ‘titulo supletorio’ type of titles.
21  They often supply credit but can also be multisectoral 
cooperatives. Regarding credit, a threshold to grant credit 
has been defined above which a legal title is required. This 
threshold goes from about US$ 2000 to about US$ 4500. De-
spite this rule, all institutions are following different criteria 
to grant credit. However, social recognition seems to be as 
important as a legal title even for credit amount above the 
threshold. This means that also in the local rural credit mar-
ket, a mixture between contractual guarantees originating in 
formal state law and informal social arrangements are nec-
essary to make the credit market work.  (For an illustration 
of this in the case of the Fondo de Desarrollo Local, see also 
Bastiaensen, 2000, 2002).
 
22  In contrast with the agrarian reform cooperatives created 
during  the  Sandinista  and  post-Sandinista  periods,  mem-
bership in these cooperatives is not related to land property. 
These  new  cooperatives  provide  services  (credit,  commer-
cialisation,  technical  support,  etc.)  to  its  members.  Those 
tend to come from a much broader geographical area than 
the members of a typical agrarian reform cooperative, where 
most members logically live in the same village, on or close to 
the land that was received.26 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08
As a part of its broader programs in Terrabuena, 
the NGO Actuar has developed interventions with respect to 
land issues in 13 hamlets of Terrabuena. In principle, they work 
with all the institutions present in Terrabuena, but in practice 
their efforts have been matched most effectively by the AGAT 
with which they have entertained a stable and intense relation-
ship. Actuar began working on legalization issues with the view 
that a legal title would improve peasants’ access to credit; but 
nowadays their main argument is that properties of small peas-
ants without legal title might be in danger of contestation, giv-
en the on-going legalization processes that mainly favor larger 
landowners.23 In its somewhat limited area of influence (part 
of the Valley of Terrabuena), Actuar is an important NGO-actor 
in the local property rights arena and linking with higher level 
state processes, provides technical-administrative and finan-
cial support to legalize land for a limited number of peasants 
that are usually located on former cooperative land, and are 
thus required to follow the complex legal-administrative pro-
cedures to acquire individual titles. Besides its particular titling 
intervention, Actuar also supported the apparently successful 
efforts of the Terrabuena municipality to create a municipal 
cadastre of land property in the framework of the larger na-
tional effort of INIFOM24 , by triangulation of locally legitimate 
information with geo-reference data from GPS-positioning. Al-
though the municipalities’ main motivation to create this valu-
able data base was local (land) tax collection,25 it nevertheless 
also plays an important role in clarifying and securing local 
property rights. Some peasants use it to mutually clarify and 
document each others’ property rights as a way to prevent con-
flicts. In some cases, the maps and documents also constitute 
evidences during conflicts or litigations over contested prop-
erty rights at least at the local level but probably at higher level 
as well. Indeed, apparently, the NGO Actuar has made strong 
progress towards and,  nearly reached, that the more accurate 
local information would sometimes even be used to correct and 
supplement  inaccurately  registered  cadastral  information  in 
the departmental capital, Ocotal.  
Actuar and AGAT are quite visible actors with a 
strong presence in some of the agrarian reform villages in the 
Valley. They attract members since they represent a real oppor-
tunity to access resources for legalisation (and other purposes) 
and they exert strong influence on people’s beliefs and have 
contributed substantially to spreading a felt need for legal title 
in ‘their’ villages. The influence of the other institutions is more 
discrete and less strong. Some are focussed on the local elite of 
23  The argument is thus close to that of AGAT which sees 
legalization as a means to counteract land re-concentration
24   Inifom is the “Instituto Nicaraguense de fomento munici-
pal”.
25  The Terrabuena municipality does not really seem to have 
land property rights issues on its present-day agenda –which 
in itself is of course also an indication that insecurity of land 
tenure is not an urgent or severe problem. Nevertheless, the 
cadastral  system  has  been  developed  to  serve  a  multiple 
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cattle ranchers and other better endowed peasants (San Fern-
ando and 16 de Septiembre), while the FDL has a broader social 
range, but is also quite more dispersed over the territories and 
has as of yet not developed intense legalisation efforts as com-
pared to some of their other regions of operation. The CoResist 
initially had a very strong impact in the areas of its presence, 
but its influence has decreased due to waning legitimacy of 
some of its leadership.28 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08
4.		 	 lAnd	rIghts	prACtICes	In	terrAbuenA
	 	 AFter	the	deFeAt	oF	the	sAndInIstAs:
	 	 some	CAse-studIes 
Both  the  Sandinista  revolutionary  land  policies 
and the consequences of the armed peasant resistance have 
generated a series of institutional shocks that to this very day 
continue to exert substantial influence on local political strug-
gles around land property. As we indicated above, the Sandi-
nista land reform process disrupted the existing social order of 
the ‘agricultural frontier’ and its associated land rights prac-
tices. Indeed, the perceived illegitimacy of the redistributed 
land rights was one of the initial triggers of armed peasant re-
sistance. The war and in particular the frontline between the 
Sandinista army and the forces of the armed resistance that ran 
through the municipality of Terrabuena also created a strong 
divide  between  the  Sandinista-controlled,  fertile  and  easily 
accessible Valley of Terrabuena and the relatively inaccessible 
mountain areas where the armed resistance found refuge and 
the Sandinista incursions were sporadic. In order to undercut 
local support for the contras, the Sandinista military obliged all 
people in the mountains to resettle in the better-protected and 
Sandinista-controlled valley area. Logically, most of the Sandi-
nista agrarian reform was located in that same valley area, es-
pecially as it became increasingly motivated by politico-mili-
tary rather than socio-economic motives in order to secure the 
hearts and minds of the local peasants. (Bastiaensen, 1991: 194). 
The cooperatives were a logical way to secure survival of the 
resettled population as well as a practical means to organise 
a more effective defence of the local territory and to politically 
control the local population. Even though the war itself was a 
clear expression of the political contestation of the Sandinista 
reforms, there was not much internal and peaceful space to 
question the legitimacy of the redistributed land reform prop-
erty, since state (military) control was almost total within the 
confines of the Sandinista area. With the peace process and 
the unexpected electoral defeat of the Sandinistas, this situ-
ation changed drastically. The rapid decrease in state control 
and the overall political re-accommodation in the country as 
a whole also gave rise to a complex process of reorganisation 
and renegotiation of local land property rights. In Terrabuena, 
initially one observed a fierce struggle for access to land as 
well as an extremely active land market with significant in- and 
out-migration of producers following the return to the normal 
agricultural frontier dynamics, repressed by the war. Despite 
this turmoil and the concomitant legal chaos, interviews in the IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08 • 2
regions reveal that a surprising amount of local producers seem 
to have assembled reasonably secure land tenure rights – from 
their subjective point of view –, reaffirming or (re)constructing 
the local legitimacy of their rights, with or without reference to 
statutory law or national political agreements. 
4.1.     The initial contestation and renegotiation of the  
      property rights of the Sandinista agrarian 
     reform cooperatives
The  end  of  the  war,  the  change  of  political  re-
gime and the ensuing reduction of the state, and in particular 
its interventionist role in the agrarian reform sector, radically 
changed the conditions for the Sandinista cooperatives. As a 
consequence, the cooperatives’ land property rights were re-
organised and renegotiated in response to both an internal and 
an external questioning of the prevailing rights and practices. 
Rights and rules, derived from the collective Sandinista model 
of vertical outside control, were immediately questioned from 
within the cooperatives themselves, inducing cooperative mem-
bers to parcel out the collective land. Sometimes this individu-
alization was already in place before the end of the revolution-
ary regime as a practical solution to the inoperative collective 
organisation of production. On the other hand, the appearance 
of  anti-Sandinista  and  contra-revolutionary  forces  in  formal 
and informal political arenas also implied a more fundamental 
questioning of the legitimacy of the cooperatives’ access to the 
fertile Valley land – given the ‘illegitimate’ political origin of 
these rights. Even though the peace and transition agreements 
at the national political level legally, and thus theoretically, se-
cured land property rights of the former cooperatives and their 
members, in actual practice cooperatives still had to make their 
claims validated and accepted at the local level. 
In the first period after the end of the armed con-
flict, the initial demand for land by the demobilized combatants 
of the Sandinista army as well as the ‘contra’ forces intensi-
fied the historical struggle for land in Nicaragua. Following the 
peace agreements, a substantial amount of additional land was 
redistributed to ex-contras, to ex-Sandinista combatants and 
workers of state firms between 1990 and 1992. Most of this land 
was obtained from the privatization of state properties, new 
colonization area in the agricultural frontier and also the partial 
redistribution of Sandinista cooperatives to demobilized people 
(de Groot, 1994; Strasma, 1999). However, well into the reign of 
the new government – up to 1994 –, a large part of the ex-con-0 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08
tra peasants remained unsatisfied with the actions of the new 
government and started to doubt whether it would ever comply 
with the promises made in the peace accords. Several groups 
of ex-contras in Terrabuena therefore started occupying land 
of Sandinista cooperatives by force in order to strengthen their 
claims to the land that in their view was promised to them. In 
response to these land occupations and the threat of violence 
amidst the hostage crisis, the government stepped up the ne-
gotiations about access to land for these ex-contras with the 
occupied cooperatives as well as other local land owners will-
ing to sell additional land. Finally, the re-contra movement, as 
it was called, managed to negotiate seven large land proper-
ties that would be grouped in and administrated through the 
CoResist. In theory, the cost of the newly acquired land would 
be shared in equal parts between the state and the new mem-
ber-owners. As we have already indicated, by giving a collec-
tive title and thereby imposing an at least partially centralised 
administration, this new agrarian reform had a number of char-
acteristics, similar to the previous Sandinista reform, especially 
in terms of the power imbalance between cooperative leaders 
(authoritarian patrons) and ordinary members (dependent cli-
ents, often longing for more autonomy).  This situation would 
persist until individual members would repay their 50% share 
of the land price and thereby gain the right to process an indi-
vidual title. 
The pressure on the land from the returning contra 
forces was however felt long before the occupation took place 
and beyond the occupied cooperatives. In a way, the latter was 
a kind of final round of the on-going negotiation in which the 
contras (and some of their leaders in need of political clout), 
unsatisfied with what they had achieved up to then, success-
fully claimed a last additional share of the land. Indeed from 
the very beginning of the post-revolutionary regime, the fate of 
the Sandinista cooperatives was far from clear, despite the all 
too general reassurance of the emergency laws n°88 in princi-
ple guaranteeing property rights to cooperative members. In 
the predominantly anti-Sandinista Terrabuena, the local legiti-
macy of the ownership rights for the Sandinista cooperatives 
clearly had to be reconstructed and re-imposed. The initial fear 
of former owners reclaiming their land rapidly faded away. Pro-
vided their claims were accepted as legitimate, the new govern-
ment proposed financial compensation rather than restitution 
of land, and most owners also preferred this solution. Howev-
er, given the problem of the mass of demobilised combatants 
looking for land, contestation of cooperative ownership came IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08 • 1
from this new group claiming to have similar entitlements to 
the redistributed fertile land of the cooperatives. Where local 
pressure on land mounted, the leadership of Sandinista coop-
eratives usually realized quickly that access to the redistributed 
land had to be renegotiated with the influential returnees. The 
local peace commissions, operating in the region after the end 
of the war with the mission to accompany the return of refu-
gees and former combatants, often played an active role in the 
facilitation of these negotiation processes. 
In actual practice, the problem of contra and other 
demobilized combatants’ pressure on agrarian reform land26 
became mixed up with pressure ‘from below’ by the rank and 
file of cooperative membership to parcel out the collective land. 
With the demise of political and military Sandinista control of 
the cooperative and with the disappearance of subsidies, cheap 
credit and other social advantages provided by the revolution-
ary  state,  the  undesired  collective  mode  of  production  was 
no longer viable, nor was there anyone to impose the model. 
Most cooperatives there rapidly decided to give each member 
individual access to a specific parcel, where they could at least 
try to eke out some staple foods in order to guarantee some 
food self-sufficiency in the short term (D’Exelle & Bastiaensen, 
2000). 
The post-war experience of the Pedro Arrauz coop-
erative in Valle de Bernardo serves well to illustrate the kind of 
processes that took place. Initially, the leadership decided to 
form four decentralised commissions, composed of members of 
the cooperative, in order to parcel out the collective land. Given 
local pressure from the contra-side, they rapidly decided to cre-
ate two additional commissions composed of demobilized com-
batants looking for land. This decision was taken in the frame-
work of overall negotiations with the demobilized returnees and 
their former leadership in the local peace commissions, where 
the need to share some of the redistributed land was also pro-
moted as a means to facilitate pacification. The Pedro Arrauz 
cooperative granted 100 manzanas27 to each of two ex-demo-
bilized commissions, while it kept 1200 out of the original 1452 
manzanas to be shared among the members of the four initial 
commissions. Such sharing of land by Sandinista cooperative 
was obviously an initial and politically necessary first step to 
secure further local legitimacy of land rights. 
26  In Terrabuena most of the returned combatants belonged 
to the forces of the resistance.
27  One manzana = 0,7 hectares2 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08
Evidently, the process of dividing up the coopera-
tives’ land among its members was fraught with many difficul-
ties. Sometimes there were complications in defining the mem-
bers that would be entitled to the redistributed land, since the 
actual members at the time of the division often only poorly 
matched the list of original members mentioned in the collec-
tive agrarian reform title. In certain cases, former members 
indeed turned up to claim their part of the land. Once the is-
sue of entitled membership was clarified, the trickier problem 
of dividing up the patrimony of the cooperative had to be dealt 
with. Certain cooperatives had to sell off part of their land to 
clear pending debts, since the change of government also im-
plied an unannounced and unexpected end to the Sandinista 
policy of continuous debt remission. Once this problem solved, 
the real process of dividing up the cooperative could be tackled. 
Obviously, the cooperatives’ land was heterogeneous in sev-
eral relevant aspects, such as access to roads, water sources, 
topography, soil quality, housing and productive infrastructure, 
and so on. Inevitably, it was an almost impossible task to reach 
a negotiated consensus on a just distribution of the land.  In 
actual practice, the process was under the strict control of the 
Sandinista leadership of the cooperative, which among others 
defined the criteria to be used for the purpose of the division. 
Besides obvious criteria, such as the estimated value of the 
land, age and sex of the members, also more political criteria 
such as the previous disposition to defend the Sandinista revo-
lution were taken into account. Given the prevailing patronage 
structures, the Sandinista leadership ‘naturally’ ended up with 
the best pieces of land located near the previous centre of the 
cooperative (and the road), where most of the collectives’ farm 
infrastructure and equipment was located. Possibly using (and 
abusing) their privileged access to resources during the Sandi-
nista period, many of them also turned out to have acquired 
private land outside the cooperative before its division.28 Power 
asymmetries thus played a crucial and un-equalizing role in the 
internal division of agrarian reform land.
28  Case-studies of Nitlapán about cooperatives in the Ma-
saya-Carazo region in the beginning of the 1990s document-
ed that some of the leadership abused part of the collective 
loans for private land purchases.  (Personal communication 
of researchers)IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08 • 
4.2.     Land market activation and the struggle for 
     autonomy
The dissolution of the cooperatives as the struc-
ture regulating access to land did not immediately undermine 
the power and control of the cooperatives’ leadership, although 
it obviously weakened them since the flow of income from col-
lective production and state subsidies, which they previously 
intermediated,  vanished.  Some  cooperative  leaders,  as  the 
formal representatives of the cooperative, formally maintained 
their control over the land as they were the depositaries of the 
collective title. This was the case where cooperatives did not 
manage to pass through all the necessary and complex legal 
procedures to formalise the division and providing members 
with individual land titles. Most of the previous leaders also 
tried to engage in a new style of patronage with their poorer 
‘constituency’ and thereby renewing their leadership as well as 
vesting uncontested property rights of the land and other re-
sources they appropriated. (see also below) When the smaller 
peasants wanted to have access to loans, they often also were 
the only local contacts, with sufficient collateral, to which these 
peasants could turn to serve as co-guarantors of the loans. 
The lack of a formal title did however not hamper 
that the de facto individualised land plots were heavily traded 
in a very active local land market, even when the legal status of 
the plots – being covered by the collective title – was quite un-
certain and the sale of these plots thus quite problematic from 
a legal point of view.29 As a testimony to the limited relevance 
of state legal provisions and rules in the local political arenas 
around land, quite many of the new individual owners quickly 
decided to sell their plots, either to local finqueros30 or to new 
(small and medium-sized peasant) immigrants coming from the 
western dry zone looking for cheaper land now that the region 
was pacified. In the Pedro Arrauz cooperative, all of the Sandi-
nista commissions have dissolved for lack of remaining original 
members; except the commissions formed by the original lead-
ers, who later formed a new cooperative that to date remains 
the central reference point in the area. From all the ex-contras 
that had received land, only one member is still present, all oth-
ers sold out and left. A similar evolution could also be noted in 
the newly created cooperatives of the CoResist, where appar-
ently the first concern of many had been to get a piece of the 
cake and then to mobilise its value in order to invest it in a new 
farm in a more desired location, or to migrate to the cities or 
simply to survive during a certain period.
29  Rather than being an impediment for the development of 
local land market, as usually assumed by economists (Plat-
teau, in Lavinge Deville, 1998), the lack of formal (individual) 
legal title thus rather seems to have been a stimulus, since 
it was at least in part insecurity of land ownership of the 
initial owners that drove the willingness to sell. At the same 
time, lack of title does not deter sufficiently embedded peas-
ant smallholders to buy land and feel sufficiently secure. (Of 
course, in the case of real outsiders this could be different.). 
Moreover, to the extent that the act of buying increases le-
gitimacy and security of land rights, the assumed causality 
between security and land transactions may also go in the 
opposite direction.
30    Baumeister  &  Fernandez  (2005)  indicate  that  at  a  na-
tional level part of the redistributed agrarian reform land has 
passed to the hand of finqueros. • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08
A combination of several reasons seems to have 
spurred  this  sellout  by  many  agrarian  reform  beneficiaries. 
Some seem to have had positive reasons to sell their share 
of the cooperative as they preferred to return to the same (or 
other) land-richer mountain areas, deeper in the agricultural 
frontier, from which they were driven away by the war. However, 
many beneficiaries also had negative reasons to sell out such 
as fear to lose their land or distrust in the cooperative’ leader-
ship. They rather preferred to cash in – even at a high discount 
in a relatively shallow land market – than to risk losing every-
thing in an uncertain future.  Often people also wanted to start 
a new life and to get away from the people and the tensions 
related to the war.
In  practice,  these  massive  land  sales  by  the 
original, ordinary cooperative members have contributed sig-
nificantly to the re-establishment of local legitimacy of land 
ownership in the areas of the former cooperatives. These new 
individual owners had in fact acquired their ownership rights, 
not by means of a fiercely contested political gift as in the case 
of the original members,31 but through an act of buying, which 
is one of the ways to gain legitimate property rights in the ag-
ricultural frontier – as we have indicated above. At the same 
time, the land transactions were facilitated by informal infor-
mation networks, running along extended family lines, such 
that many of the recently arrived peasants turned out to be 
relatives or friends of local peasant producers or – for that mat-
ter- of some of the agrarian reform beneficiaries who decided 
not to leave and managed to integrate successfully in the local 
communities. This contributed to facilitate the social integra-
tion of the new migrants in the new territory as well as to en-
hance the legitimacy of their land rights. At the same time, the 
landscape of the previously collectively managed farm started 
to change radically, with a uniform landscape of monoculture 
transformed into a patchwork of buoyant smallholder farms, 
growing corn and beans, and accumulating pigs and cattle. Af-
ter some years, these evolutions managed to transform locally 
illegitimate land rights into locally accepted and surprisingly 
secure individual property rights, despite the dubious formal 
legal status of the plots, given that they officially still belonged 
to the collective land ownership of the cooperative, backed by 
a collective agrarian reform title. In the communities itself, the 
private sales documents were quite sufficient to sustain claims 
of ownership to the land.
31  The use of the concept ‘original’ members is a little bit 
tricky  here,  since  the  membership  of  the  Sandinista  coop-
eratives was highly volatile. Many of the actual membership 
at the time of the end of the war did in fact not correspond 
to the first, ‘really original’ membership. As long as the war 
raged,  members  of  Sandinista  cooperatives  in  Terrabuena 
were however clearly identified as active (and usually) armed 
supporters of the Sandinista regime –even when some of this 
support was possibly more due to an urgent need for survival 
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Some  problems  persist,  however,  in  the  often 
mutually uneasy relationship between these new owners and 
the cooperative leadership, which formally continues to be the 
custodian of the collective legal title and thereby inevitably ex-
tends some control over the newly arrived peasants.  Many of 
the ordinary ‘old’ and ‘new’ owners of land from previous coop-
eratives express interest in a formal title as a means to end this 
patronage by the cooperative leadership – even when the local 
leadership is not necessarily disliked, nor actively pursues this 
patronage. In particular, for those requiring larger amounts of 
productive credit, the lack of an individual title reduces the op-
portunities for a more flexible access (without the need for a lo-
cal co-guarantor – as we said often inevitably richer peasants 
from among the previous cooperative leadership).  
The  case  of  the  CoResist  ‘cooperative’  provides 
however a more problematic version of these problems. There, 
the government did not comply with its promise to reimburse 
half of the value of the loans that were contracted to finance 
the purchase of the redistributed land. Even though a major do-
nor apparently contributed a substantial amount to the organi-
zation, confusion arose as to whether the common ex-contra 
beneficiaries now had to repay the full amount of the land value, 
as well as additional legalization costs, if they wanted to ac-
quire an individual title. This evidently made it far more difficult 
for peasant members to gain their autonomy from the coopera-
tive leadership. But even without this additional complication 
most of the beneficiaries as well as the new owners, who had 
acquired their rights from other initial beneficiaries, could not 
afford to pay what was required to obtain an individual title 
and therefore remained under the custody of the cooperative’s 
leadership. 
Grounded in their possession of the collective title, 
the leaders, among which a politically well-connected influen-
tial local landowner, also exercised a significant control over 
land use as they apparently decided about the transfer or even 
the denial of individual land rights – a practice whose legal ‘co-
operative’ foundation remains unclear.  
In  one  of  the  CoResist  cooperatives,  excessive 
abuses by the local representative of the cooperative leader-
ship led to an outright rebellion and subsequent overthrow of 
the centralised control over the land. For years, peasants had 
felt they had been treated badly by the local leader, the CoRe-
sist and the government. Yet peasants expressed that they en-
dured these hardships since they were afraid of losing their land 6 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08
if they would raise their voice, as indeed has been the case in 
the neighbouring village. Some of the original peasant mem-
bers therefore sold their land and were replaced by new settlers, 
among which a local trader: quite more autonomous, less de-
pendent and socially more powerful. At a certain moment, the 
local leader and the CoResist decided to sell a piece of land on 
which a school, financed with external aid, had been built for 
the benefit of the community. This turned out to be an excellent 
opportunity for some of the newly arrived settlers, who had ex-
perience with community organisation from a neighbouring vil-
lage, to react and gather widespread support in the community 
and beyond, in order to resist this arbitrary and detrimental de-
cision. In the community elections that followed these events, 
the local leader was replaced and lost his control over the vil-
lage and the cooperative. The new leadership then claimed the 
collective title to their land which was still formally deposited 
with the CoResist. By actively looking for the support of the 
municipality and some NGOs, like Actuar, they finally managed 
to get hold of the title. In other words, by exerting local politi-
cal pressure they were clearly able to dispossess the self-pro-
claimed ‘legal’ proprietors, or at least the holders of the legal ti-
tle. Afterwards, the NGO Actuar helped them with the process 
to obtain individual titles for all the owners, which was much 
desired as a safeguard against possible future abuses by any 
new leadership.  Following this rebellion against the abuses of 
the leadership and also because of the different social status 
and self-perception of the new owners, the usual local patron-
age structures seem to have crumbled, creating new spaces 
for the development of more horizontal relationships between 
more autonomous individual landowners. IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08 • 
4.3.     The re-invention of Sandinista patronage
Not all circumstances are the same, however, and 
in certain cases the dismantled cooperatives and their Sandini-
sta leadership were quite successful in re-inventing and re-es-
tablishing their previous patronage-role under the new condi-
tions. In these cases, the dependency relationship between the 
ex-cooperative leadership and their surrounding clients was 
continued with hardly any contestation by the latter as it was 
perceived  functional  for  their  (survival)  purposes.  The  most 
successful in this strategy were the local Sandinista elites in 
the village of Valle de Bernardo. This village even became an ex-
ceptional case in the Nicaraguan agrarian reform history, since 
most of the cooperatives’ organisational structures remained 
active even after the land was parcelled out even when many 
of the original members have been replaced by new owners. To 
a large extent, this has been made possible by the ex-coopera-
tive leaderships’ capacity to establish privileged linkages with 
external non-governmental aid agencies to their benefit and 
that of their poorer constituency. A particularly important role 
has been played by the AGAT, created in 1995 with the specific 
aim to reactivate the cooperatives in the region which at the 
time were at the verge of economic and political collapse. 
In  Valle  de  Bernardo,  the  Sandinista  leadership 
created a new cooperative linked to the AGAT of which they 
‘naturally’ assumed the presidency.32  Based on the flow of re-
sources running through these structures, they continued to be 
local gatekeepers of external subsidies for those belonging to 
their constituency within and outside the cooperative, much 
like had been the case before in their relation with the Sandini-
sta state. This process was facilitated by the strategy of most 
development agencies in the region (mostly NGOs) to adopt 
a community-driven approach to development, which can eas-
ily be matched with the cooperative discourse and practise of 
the local leadership – even though the relative effectiveness in 
reaching some (not all!) of the poorer sections of the community 
hides a more problematic reality of patronage and dependency, 
often unknown or ignored by the well-intended NGOs.33 
As  far  as  the  issue  of  the  land  property  is  con-
cerned,  one  can  note  that  this  successful  resumption  of  pa-
tronage strongly reduced the subjective perceptions of tenure 
insecurity.  Even  when  the  present  leadership  initially  might 
have been perceived as having unjustly appropriated a dispro-
portionate amount of better quality land and farm infrastruc-
32 In fact, the new cooperative largely corresponds to the 
commission to which all of the leadership belonged and that 
was  formed at the time of the dismantling of the cooperative 
(see above).
33  We do not mean to suggest here that there is no genuine 
horizontal collective action taking place within and around 
these cooperatives, but we do stress that there are inevitably 
problems of patronage and power hierarchies in the relations 
between  the  richer,  better  connected  and  more  powerful 
members with the poorer, less knowledgeable members.8 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08
ture, their property rights are by now often firmly legitimized in 
the local social networks, which does not prevent however that 
they would prefer to have individual titles (especially in view 
of guaranteeing a better access to credit).34 The situation to a 
large extent mirrors the history and function of the finqueros in 
the agricultural frontier. Given successful and effective patron-
age, without excessive abuses of arbitrary power, most small-
holders in their sphere of influence do not feel an urgent need to 
have an individual formal title in order to protect them from po-
tential abuses by the cooperatives’ leadership either. The pres-
ence of the re-invented and re-invigorated cooperative struc-
tures, with their upwards links to the AGAT and the municipal 
and national Sandinista party structures, indeed generates a 
general perception of stronger security in the face of any future 
inside or outside threats of contestation of their property rights. 
In fact, one should observe that due to the local legitimacy of 
land rights, the prospects of contestation of any right are quite 
small. A desire for individual title can however be observed by 
those who have a need to contract credit, including the richer 
proprietors themselves. 
In the face of a higher relative security of tenure 
in Valle de Bernardo, as compared  to other villages where the 
local leadership has not been equally successful in recreating 
effective patronage structures, it is rather paradoxical that a 
disproportional  part  of  the  beneficiaries  of  Actuar’s  (signifi-
cantly subsidized) titling program are nevertheless situated in 
this village. From the neighbouring village of Limayito only the 
former cooperative leader managed to ‘get onto the list’.35  Yet, 
in Limayito, where the former Sandinista patronage structures 
have largely disintegrated and a much more fragmented social 
structure has emerged (D’Exelle, et al., 2004),  our interviews 
showed that expressions of tenure insecurity by agrarian re-
form beneficiaries are much more pronounced. There is notably 
more fear about a possible outside contestation of the agrar-
ian reform titles, which is spurred by the loss of the collective 
title in the turmoil caused by Hurricane Mitch, even though 
that title had been properly registered previously. Most peas-
ants in Limayito however lack the information and the access 
to funds and assistance to engage in the complicated process 
of legalization. Except in the post-Mitch resettlement area, the 
capacity for local collective action which could be helpful in this 
context is also quite deficient in Limayito.
34  There are also cases where ex-leaders have not managed 
to consolidate their positions as local gatekeepers and there 
a stronger desire for a legal title as a safeguard against pos-
sible contestation of the property right can be observed.
35  This of course provides just another example of how im-
portant external and internal social connections are in order 
to get access to resources in the local political arenas, includ-
ing those around NGO and other aid resources.IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08 • 
4.4.    The arrival of new powerful migrants
The issue of abuses by the more powerful local ac-
tors in order to get (cheap) access to land and the role of patron-
age as a local legitimating mechanism is not at all limited to 
ex-Sandinista or ex-contra leadership practices with respect to 
agrarian reform land. It has been an attribute of local land mar-
ket practices of the agricultural frontier from its very beginning. 
Land grabbing in a weak institutional environment is in fact one 
of its defining characteristics. It should therefore not come as 
a surprise that similar practices reappeared after the war when 
the ‘normal’ agricultural frontier dynamics resumed and new 
migrants from the western dry zone arrived in the region look-
ing for cheaper land. Some of them were well-endowed urban 
migrants who put small peasants under pressure to sell their 
plots, and in this way managed to accumulate considerable 
amounts of land in a relatively short time. Pressure was often 
exerted by not respecting the local rules regulating access to 
land and water (often critical in the reformed cooperatives) or 
by  allowing  cattle  to  damage  farmer  crops.  Sometimes  out-
right intimidation was applied. In most cases, affected peas-
ants – especially the poorest ones – did not have the capacity 
to denounce these pressures and were forced to sell, often at 
far below market prices.  
In  Valle  de  Bernardo,  local  informants  often  re-
fer to the case of a migrant, coming from a provincial town in 
the more developed west of Nicaragua. This man could amass 
around 800 mzs. (while the typical average amount of typical 
small peasant is less than 20 mzs), gradually buying plots from 
small peasants living on agrarian reform land.  Apparently, and 
despite the fact that other peasants were in the impossibility to 
legalise this land, he managed to legalise part of it by the ‘titulo 
supletorio’ mechanism. In the hamlet of La Carreta, a similar 
evolution could be observed, with one rich new migrant buying 
land and accumulating up to 200 mzs.  
It is crystal-clear that the state law does not pro-
vide a lot of protection against such land grabbing practices. In 
particular, it is interesting to note that small peasant-owners 
tend to be better protected against such practices to the extent 
that they can rely on local networks of support to defend their 
interests. There are indications that, for example, the powerful 
new migrant in Valle de Bernardo is quite restricted in his capa-
bility to force involuntary land sales by those small peasants 
who have consolidated themselves in the constituency of the 0 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08
local Sandinista leadership – a factor which of course also con-
tributes to strengthen the latter’s patronage structures. This il-
lustrates what was mentioned above about the capacity of the 
renewed cooperatives to shield off any contestation of prop-
erty rights in its area of influence. Those who sold land were 
the poorest and inadequately connected peasants, incapable of 
mobilising the necessary local support against the aggression 
by the richer farmer. It is also interesting to note the difference 
between the strategy of the new outsider owners in Valle de 
Bernardo and in La Carreta. In the smaller, more traditional and 
better-integrated community of La Carreta, the migrant-land-
owner has developed multi-stranded, new patronage relation-
ships, including with some of the peasants that he left landless 
and who became sharecroppers and/or agricultural labourers 
on his farm. This producer also invested a significant amount 
of time and resources in building good relations with the local 
elite in the community. In the larger and socio-politically more 
divided Valle de Bernardo, the powerful migrant apparently did 
not care so much about his local integration, creating very few 
linkages with the community and relying heavily on the official 
law and – probably even more – on his own private capacity to 
defend his ‘rights’.36 
4.5.     Local arenas in the mountain villages 
The villages in the mountains to the north of the ur-
ban centre show a different kind of local arrangements around 
land issues than the communities in the Valley region. Indeed, 
the latter have experienced far greater institutional disturbances 
than the mountain villages, such that their local land arenas are 
more varied and complex than in most of the mountain villages. 
Also, better roads and easier access in the Valley increase the 
mobility of community members and stimulate the presence 
of multiple external organisations and related resource flows. 
Nevertheless, also the mountain villages suffered from the war 
as most of its population was forcefully relocated (mostly to the 
Valley) as a consequence of the contra-insurgency strategy of 
the Sandinista military. Those who did not follow Sandinista 
orders had no choice but to flee over the border to contra-revo-
lutionary refugee camps in Honduras and/or to join the irregu-
lar insurgent forces. Beyond these drastic temporary measures, 
state intervention in the mountains was however almost inex-
istent and in particular no land reform processes occurred. After 
the war, many of the people who left, or were forced to leave,37 
returned to their original villages and gradually resumed their 
normal way of life based on their traditional values and rela-
36  According to local gossip, the origin of the wealth of this 
new migrant could be related to illicit activities. This might 
be the factor that explains the relative absence of a search 
for local legitimacy and embeddedness, which makes this 
case somewhat deviant from the usual strategy to vest legiti-
macy of land rights in the establishment of local patronage 
relationships.
37  Although some people could not, or did not want, to re-
turn to their original villages due to their contested political 
choice in the turbulent period of the war, for most of them 
their choice at the time does not seem to impact much on 
present-day relationships. Of course, relocation was forced 
and often the families on each side maintained much more 
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tionships. Social differentiation, and in particular the number 
of landless inhabitants, is quite inferior to that in the Valley 
region. Also, some of the villages are dominated by extended 
family-networks, such that many land issues are reduced to in-
ter-family conflict and inheritance issues. 
In these circumstances, it does not come as a sur-
prise that most (of the few) disputes around land are solved 
through local social arrangements with little outside, legal or 
other, intervention. Disputes of a more serious nature are first 
of all mediated by the informal local rural legal mediators (facil-
itadores judiciales rurales). In most villages this seems to func-
tion quite well, except for one village where the local mediator 
was apparently an outsider piloted into the function without 
much local consultation, nor information. In another village, 
we also found that the local (Terrabuena) judge was sometimes 
called in by the local facilitator to serve as an outside mediator. 
Apparently, this was mainly due to the existence of a good per-
sonal relationship between the judge and the local “facilitador 
judicial rural”, who is also the recognised village leader. The 
local judge is only consulted when there is a need for outside 
mediation in order to resolve the issues in a satisfactory way. 
Such rather exceptional cases are however arbitrated by the 
judge without referring to state law, but rather by mediating 
and subsequently acknowledging agreements between the dif-
ferent local parties. Written documents are usually elaborated 
to formalise the more difficult local agreements between land-
owners in dispute. 
In the mountain villages, a number of people are 
informed about the procedures to legalize land property (usu-
ally through the lighter mechanism of the ‘titulo supletorio’, 
since only some of the land has any previous legal history in the 
area). All of our informants in the mountain villages, including 
the leader/’facilitador judicial rural’ of the village of San Sebas-
tian, agree however that even this lighter procedure is still too 
costly and complex compared to its limited utility, given that 
most land property is uncontested and access to credit is unat-
tainable for most producers anyway.38 
In one of the communities, we also found an in-
teresting illustration of the functioning of informal ‘agricultural 
frontier principles’ in local land arenas. In this community, 11 
better endowed families with between 20 and 500 mzs of land 
share the area with poorer families that migrated more recently. 
One of the larger landowners rented out some of his land to one 
38   With the expansion of the rural microfinance from FDL and 
the 16 de Septiembre cooperative this could however change 
and indeed some of the larger finqueros express a potential 
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of these smaller producers for seven subsequent years and af-
ter that time found his tenants claiming the ownership rights to 
that land when the landowner decided to break their arrange-
ment. The conflict was solved entirely within the community, 
without any outside legal or other interference. It was mutu-
ally agreed that the landowner could maintain the ownership to 
the land, but that he had to compensate his tenants as if they 
had been working for him as day-labourers during these seven 
years. Failure to accept this (expensive) compensation would 
have made the tenant – as the one who made the land produce- 
the rightful owner of the land. While this case illustrates the 
importance of active, productive use of land for property rights 
to maintain their local legitimacy, it also sheds light on the dif-
ficulties of land rental arrangement as long as the tenant dem-
onstrates his productive capacity and undermines the owners’ 
right (see also page 16). Moreover, it could be perceived as a 
constraint for larger farmers’ decision-making power. Despite 
the fact that patronage constitutes a principle of entitlement to 
land and that respect for patrons’property rights prevail in the 
Terrabuena municipality, the outcome of this conflict’s resolu-
tion shows also the obligation for larger landowners to assume 
their responsibilities towards smaller peasants. IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08 • 
5.		 	 some	ConClusIons	And	Comments	
Despite the exploratory character of our research 
in Terrabuena, it nevertheless clearly demonstrates the variety 
and complexity of the locally specific institutional processes in 
land-related political arenas. We also found many indications 
of the diversity of ways in which local actors creatively play 
with different principles of entitlement, referring to either the 
complex legal framework of the state or the local laws pro-
duced in the evolving social field of the agricultural frontier. It 
is clear that legal issues play a definitive role in the local arenas. 
However, this role is not to be seen as unequivocal, independ-
ent or once and for all arbitration between conflicting claims, 
but rather as a strategic resource to be mobilised by actors in 
the social negotiations and local struggles over the legitimacy 
of their land rights. State legal land rights and state law in gen-
eral are only valid to the extent that they can be made to be 
respected and valid in the local political arenas. And this valid-
ity is foremost dependent upon dominating local perceptions 
and power relations. Therefore, the entitlements of participa-
tion, i.e. the social position “closely linked to membership in so-
cial networks and participation in both formal and informal political 
processes” (Berry, 1993: 104) are indeed the determinant factor 
in the struggle over land resources. This conclusion is quite 
similar to that of Broegaard (2005) who, based on fieldwork in 
another region of Nicaragua, also concluded that there was no 
straightforward link between legal title and tenure security. 
Other studies on Honduras (Jansen & Roquas, 1998) also con-
cluded that the state on its own did not have the capacity to 
define and enforce property rights in land.
Following this fundamental diagnostic, it is hard 
to see how a one shot state-led legal intervention, by means of 
a comprehensive land titling program, would change these real 
world conditions on the ground. In fact, our analysis gave clear 
examples how poor and politically weak land owners can be 
forced to ‘voluntarily’ sell their land by more powerful actors. 
Rather than believing that a comprehensive titling program 
would solve these issues in Nicaragua, when in fact it has failed 
elsewhere (Platteau, 2000), it could therefore be worthwhile to 
reflect about another type of state and legal intervention that 
would explicitly recognize legal pluralism and the locally nego-
tiated character of land rights. An alternative approach might 
consist of the creation of more flexible local institutions aimed 
to contribute to better local land management practices (e.g. 
like the intermediating and arbitrating role played by the local  • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08
judge in one of the mountain villages). Such an approach could 
also offer new opportunities to try to equalise power relations 
within the local arenas, by defining certain rules of the game 
and by creating more effective –easier accessible and better in-
formed- mechanisms of appeal. Fundamentally, however, the 
social position of actors will always remain key and therefore 
programs that try to foment local organisation and social inte-
gration of the weaker sections of society are very much want-
ed.
We also believe that our tentative analysis indi-
cates that detailed studies about local land management prac-
tices leading to a better, qualitative understanding of land-re-
lated issues are quite necessary. Our analysis indeed also casts 
doubts on some of the more detailed elements of the domi-
nant received wisdom. Mainly based on econometric research 
on a nation-wide sample (Deininger & Chamorro, 2000, 2002; 
Delaiglesia, 2003), this received wisdom asserts that (a) pub-
licly registered titles are necessary in order to create security of 
tenure that would enhance the willingness to invest and spur 
the development of local land markets and (b) that no credit-
collateral effect, that would also enhance the capacity to invest, 
was found due to a lack of rural credit supply altogether. In Ter-
rabuena, we found however that the lack of (registered) legal 
land titles has not impeded the development of the local land 
market, but rather that the reactivated local land market has 
significantly enhanced the legitimacy of land property rights -
sometimes even more than the mere possessing of a state legal 
title. We also found little evidence of widespread perceived in-
security of tenure (except maybe in some (few) remaining areas 
of conflict), which generates some doubts about the relevance 
of the nation-wide econometric evidence of a significant invest-
ment effect associated with the possession of registered legal 
titles in specific agricultural frontier regions like Terrabuena. 
Our detailed analysis, however, did show a credit 
effect, or at least, a demand for land titling as a means to fa-
cilitate access to credit. In this case, this is directly related to 
the specific policies and credit-technologies of the FDL and the 
16 de Septiembre cooperative in the study region (and thus not 
just a general expectation of such an effect –which afterwards 
might not materialise as observed in other regions (Broegaerd, 
personal communication)). In fact, without a title you are either 
restricted in the amount of credit, or you are required to find a 
co-guarantor of your loans (which often implies a longer, more 
burdensome procedure and possibly an undesired increase in IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08 • 
the ‘moral debt’ with the co-guarantor ‘patron’). In this context, 
we are however not talking about publicly registered titles, but 
mere ‘supplementary titles’ suffice for FDL and 16 de Septiem-
bre, even when these titles do not have a full official legal value 
as collateral. Both credit institutions consider that the mix of 
official legal status and local legitimacy of these ‘supplemen-
tary titles’ is enough for them to serve as guarantees for loans 
(and in fact local practice proves that they are). 
What our analysis also shows is that at least part 
of the smaller owners, especially within the reformed areas, 
might be quite interested in gaining an individual title, not nec-
essarily because they feel insecure about their tenure rights, 
but because they feel uncomfortable with their continuing de-
pendence upon the richer local ‘patrons’ (often the former lead-
ership of the cooperative). The burdensome legal procedures 
and the impossibility to apply the simpler procedure of the ‘sup-
plementary title’ are however a serious impediment for many 
of them to go through the procedures. Again, legal innovations 
that would allow simpler, locally managed procedures might be 
helpful.
Finally, following our own findings of the complex-
ity and diversity of local land right practices, it is also clear that 
a lot more local research will be needed to fine-tune interven-
tions in local arenas around land. Even in our study areas, our 
exploratory research left many relevant issues understudied, 
like e.g. the role of the local rural mediators in some of the con-
flicts that we mentioned. 6 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-08 6 • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-06
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